How close is the Tanzanian-Chinese partnership today? Bi-lateral trade and Chinese economic presence in Tanzania are much bigger than in the 1970s; China's "no strings attached" policy is still attractive; political solidarities and military cooperation have remained quite strong. However, this bi-lateral relationship does not have the importance, nor the exclusiveness it enjoyed in the heydays of socialism.
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The "all-weather friendship" dynamic appears to remain the most common characterisation on both sides, however, this bi-lateral relationship does not have the importance, nor exclusiveness it enjoyed in the heydays of socialism when Julius Nyerere and Mao Zedong presided upon the destiny of their respective country. There is some irony here because, as will be observed, bi-lateral trade and Chinese economic presence in Tanzania are much bigger than in the 1970s, a consequence of China becoming the world largest exporter; moreover, political solidarities and military cooperation have remained quite strong. However, today China's diplomatic and economic influence on Tanzania is far from being overwhelming. In other words, as elsewhere in Africa and in the world, Tanzania's relations with China has been affected first by the end of the Cold War and since the mid-2000s by the growing Sino -American and Sino-Western geo-strategic, economic and ideological competition. As a result, although both in Dar es Salaam and Beijing this relationship has remained presented as "special", it has lost the structural role it had until the late 1970s in shaping Sino-African relations.
In other words, deep changes both in Tanzania's domestic economic and political environment and in the world order contribute to explaining the relative decline of the Sino-Tanzanian partnership. However, more importantly, has been the Tanzanian decision to embark into a new foreign policy that has been aimed at rebalancing its external relations and moving away from a bandwagoning policy towards China.
Tanzania is not the only African state to have become more active internationally and to enjoy in its negotiations with emerging powers a position that is stronger than many think (Vickers, 2013) . It is true that Sino-Western relations in Africa, and especially in Tanzania, cannot only be looked at through the prism of competition: although all companies compete for market shares, whatever their nationality is, there is as much space for complementarity as for competition in Africa: moreover, Tanzania, as many African countries, do not want and do not have reasons to choose (Dollar, 2016 : 97-98, Shinn, 2016 .
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world is moving from a unipolar towards a multipolar structure or even a kind of new and rather asymmetrical bipolarity (Tunsjø, 2011) between the US and Chinaone superpower, one "emerging potential superpower" and a few great powers (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2016) . In this new international environment, in order to better protect their interest, smaller countries need even more than the big ones to hedge against risks (Tessman, 2012: 205) . That is precisely what Tanzania has been doing since the early 2000s in order to reduce the systemic asymmetry of its relationship with China. While in this respect Tanzania's situation is not totally dissimilar from China's neighbours as Vietnam or Malaysia (Womack, 2010) , it is far from having adopted what some international relations theorists such as Kuik would call a "balancing strategy" or even an "indirect balancing strategy": Tanzania is not trying nor able to contain China's influence or adopt full-fledge "risk-contingency options" and a "hedging strategy" (Kuik, 2008: 166, 171; Kuik, 2016: 502-506) . However, if we keep using Kuik's terminology, our hypothesis is that the Tanzania government has moved from a "bandwagoning strategy" to an "insurance policy" that has kept elements of "binding engagement" with China but looks more and more as promoting "economic pragmatism". In other words, it has adopted what Kuik calls "returnsmaximising options" (Kuik, 2008 : 502, Kuik, 2016 . Tanzania still accepts China's power but it also accepts and tend to welcome to a larger extent US and other Western countries' co-operation and influence. It has taken advantage of the growing China-Western strategic and economic competition to improve its bargaining power with both and reduce the undesired effects of a close but also asymmetrical relationship with China.
This article is based both on fieldwork conducted in 2012 in Tanzania and updated Tanzanian, Chinese and Western primary as well as secondary sources. Our method and approach have been to look at the Tanzanian-Chinese relationship from Tanzania's viewpoint and to reflect on this country's changing perceptions of China as well as of other partners. In this aim, we have chosen to interview a rather small but diverse and well-informed (around thirty) sample of Tanzanians as well as Chinese and Westerners living in Tanzania, including government officials, business people, diplomats and journalists, out of which one third has been quoted in this paper (see Kamata, 2014: 94) . 4 While this feeling may be shared by a number of African leaders, does this remark genuinely encapsulate the nature of TanzaniaChina relations? As shown below, it does not.
This partnership has remained very close and specific at a number of levels: party-toparty relations, foreign policy, defence co-operation and to some extent business. After his election in October 2015, the newly elected Tanzanian President, John Magufuli, declared to Zhang Ping, Vice-Chairman of China's National People's Congress, who represented Xi Jinping at his inauguration: "we should strengthen our bi-lateral relation with a view to helping Tanzania to achieve its development goal and enable me to fulfil my promise of improving the life standards of Tanzanians".
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But a month later, Magufuli decided not to participate in the FOCAC in Johannesburg but to send his deputy, Vice-President Samia Suluhu Hassan, and a much smaller delegation (six members) than usual. 6 He preferred to take part in the Commonwealth summit held in Malta a week earlier and the Paris COP21 Conference on Climate. This symbolic choice tends to signal that in spite of the revival of SinoTanzanian relations since 2005, Tanzania's economic and political reforms have moved closer to countries that see China as a trade competitor, if not always a strategic rival (Minde, 2016) .
Contested Party to Party Relations
Today, the CCM, the Revolutionary Party and ruling party of Tanzania, has kept strong ties with the CCP. And on the domestic stage, it has maintained to some extent the influence and modus operandi that stemmed from its previous status. Both parties regularly exchange high level visits and experiences, China's "success story" remains, at least on paper, a major source of inspiration for the CCM and Tanzanian reforms. Here it should be noted that China has not tried to set up formal relations with Tanzania's other political groupings, not even the ones represented in the Bunge (National Assembly) such as the CHAMEDA (Party for Democracy and Progress) or the Civil United Front (Interview 6). The CCP may for example feel un-Jean-Pierre Cabestan and Jean-Raphae l Chaponnie re "Tanzania's all-weather friendship with China in the era of multipolarity and globalisation: towards a mild hedging strategy"
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On the Tanzanian side, the CCM-CCP relationship has remained a useful channel to reach out to China's top leaders and perpetuate a feeling of coziness with China's political elite. China is also taken as an example by the CCM to legitimise the current economic reforms in the name of "socialism" and its necessary adaptation to globalisation. On the Chinese side, this party-to-party relationship is perceived as a useful tool to better penetrate and influence Tanzania's ruling elite and export China's development model, even if Chinese officials often argue that there is not such a model and each country should follow its own path (Hanauer & Morris, 2014: 9) . 8 In any case, CCM-CCP exchanges and co-operation seem to be more pro-actively promoted by China than by Tanzania, even if the CCM is far from being indifferent to its relationship with the CCP. For example, on 25 June 2014, when Chinese VicePresident Li Yuanchao met Philip Mangula, Vice-Chairman of CCM in Dar es Salaam, Li "raised a three point proposal to develop the two parties' relations. He called on the two parties to maintain a high level of communication and deepen mutual political trust, to expand cadres exchanges and intensify communication on governance experience and to work together to hold multilateral activities to boost Chinese-African relations". 9 Likewise, on 4 July 2014, both leaders met again at the University of Dar es Salaam and "discussed how socialism can survive the modern era". Tanzanian academics taking part in this forum presented papers on the topic. Philip Mangula reiterated that Tanzania was a socialist nation drawing lessons from China, which he described as "a leading socialist country in the world." 10 These meetings and statements tend to underscore that both parties are trying to keep alive a fledging relationship that has lost most of its substance. Besides, the CCM-CCP special relationship has been questioned, both by opposition parties and even Cadres exchanges and seminars will contribute to keeping both parties interacting and China influencing Tanzania's ruling party elite. However, this relationship is more rooted in the past than in the future of the two countries' relations.
Weakening Foreign Policy and Geo-Strategic Convergences
Today, as shown below, the foreign policy and geo-strategic convergences between Tanzania and China have been weakening. While we can trace back the origins of this loosening partnership to the end of the Cold War, China's rise and its growing competition with the US, including in Africa, have persuaded Tanzanian leaders, particularly since Kikwete, to rebalance their country's foreign policy orientations in favour of the latter and diversify (Mponzi, 2014) . While China has concentrated on boosting trade and economic relations, the US, particularly under Obama has relaunched its co-operation with Tanzania in putting more financial resources in the country, promoting public-private partnerships, and including Tanzania in his "Power Africa Initiative" (Hanauer & Morris, 2015: 101-102 Obama actually pursued and consolidated a closer co-operation initiated by the Bush administration which, among other things, had set up in 2004 a large Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) grant, which doubled US aid but also linked it to progress in political and economic freedom, rule of law as well as governance. Since 2006, Tanzania has benefited from this grant, signing in 2008 with the MCC a sixyear and US$ 698 million "compact" aimed at modernising its transport, energy and water sectors. 14 Since 2014, the MCC has developed other projects related for instance to improving public power utilities.
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In the same period, China's Africa policy has expanded and also diversified, reducing to some extent Tanzania's privileged position. In Chinese leaders' eyes, Kenya has emerged as a more important political and trade partner because of the weight of its economy, its higher standard of living and its regional influence (several signifi- cant regional organisations are based in Nairobi) (Shinn and Eisenman, 2012: 266-269; Onjala, 2014) . For example, it is not a coincidence that in 2006 Beijing decided to establish the African desk of its radio and television stations in Nairobi and to broadcast in English, Swahili and Chinese from there (Wasserman, 2015; Zhang et al., 2016; Interview 10) .
It is likely that China's proposed development of ports (as in Bagamoyo) and supporting hinterland infrastructure on the East coast of Africa serves greater geostrategic interests within Africa and the Indian Ocean. And since late 2013, these interests have been "repackaged" by Beijing in Xi Jinping's "One Belt One Road" initiative, and particularly its "Maritime Silk Road" facet. Can we, however, consider these new ports as part of a "string of pearls" in which each pearl is a "a nexus of Chinese geopolitical influence or military presence" (Pehrson, 2006: 3) ? Is the economic and political rivalry between India and China the 21 st century equivalent of the "great game", whose contending sphere of influence includes the littoral states of the eastern Indian Ocean (Scott, 2008: 2) ?
As Anthony indicates:
The broader market economic system in which China and Africa engage today entails that Chinese unfettered access to projects is complicated by the interests of multiple stakeholders. The Chinese presence has been exaggerated at the expense of other actors and thus, in any future conflict, it cannot be assumed that China will be able to mobilise this infrastructure in its interests. This has implications for the broader analysis of China's growing presence in the Indian Ocean (Anthony, 2013: 134) .
More pragmatically and in a shorter future, Bagamoyo and other infrastructure projects built by China in Tanzania will contribute both to decongestioning the existing ports in the region (particularly Mombasa and Dar es Salaam) and getting an easier access to the raw materials that Beijing wishes to import (natural gas) from and the markets it hopes to reach in Eastern Africa, particularly in the Great Lake region.
Jean-Pierre Cabestan and Jean-Raphae l Chaponnie re "Tanzania's all-weather friendship with China in the era of multipolarity and globalisation: towards a mild hedging strategy" AFRICAN EAST-ASIAN AFFAIRS
THE CHINA MONITOR
The decision announced by China in November 2015 to open a dual use logistical base operated by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy in Djibouti, a much more secure and strategically better located place where France, the US and Japan already have military facilities, confirms also the overly economic and trade dimension of the Bagamoyo project. 16 Moreover, if in the longer run, Bagamoyo and other Tanzanian ports are used as supply or logistical bases for PLA navy ships cruising in the region, will this role be different from the ports (as Djibouti or Salalah) where the PLA ships involved in the anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden make regular calls?
More generally, the Tanzania-China political and diplomatic relations lack depth and engagement. As indicated in a Tanzanian action plan in 2009, "interaction generally appears to be extremely formal" (quoted by Shinn and Eisenman, 2012: 263) . China is a useful partner and alternative to Western aid and investments. As Former Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa declared in China in 2014:
China's relations with the Western countries in the African market should be competitive… China should not be seen as collaborating with them [Western countries] to stifle Africa's efforts to lift its people from poverty and disease.
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In other words, as for other African countries, it is in Tanzania's interest that the West and China (or other emerging economies) continue to compete. Likewise, it is also in its interest to keep a diplomatic and geostrategic balance between the two groups of nations and to explore more "returns-maximising options" vis-à-vis China. As Shinn and Eisenman indicated, the Tanzanian government "understands the potential risk in a monopoly position for Chinese contractors and unfavourable deals tied to Chinese assistance" (2012: 263). However, this potential risk looks more and more remote today, even if Tanzania-China military co-operation has intensified since 2000.
An enhanced military co-operation
Rooted in the history of their bi-lateral relations, military co-operation between Tan- China has also been involved in the construction of military infrastructures such as the National Defence College built by a Chinese company, financed by both governments and handed over to the TPDF in January 2011 (Kamata, 2014: 96) . And in 2015, it funded two projects aimed at improving the Ngerengere Air Force base and equip it with the capacity to receive large passenger planes whenever there is an emergency at the Julius Nyerere International Airport in Dar es Salaam. Since the early 2000s, Tanzania has tried to diversify its arms suppliers, getting weapons or military equipment from Ukraine and Western countries such as the UK, Germany, Italy (IVECO transport vehicles, helicopters), the US (patrol boats) and for light weapons, South Africa. Some of the equipment is donated. However, volumes have remained small according to UN data. 21 The TPDF have in addition maintained a small co-operation with Cuba and North Korea (Interview 5). The American government has also been involved in military personnel training. The US is willing to give Tanzania a role in Africom, organising joint exercises with East African countries and training Tanzanian soldiers for UN Peace-Keeping Operations or antipiracy and anti-terrorism missions (Interview 8).
Some observers argue today that for its defence also, Tanzania has moved closer to the US than China. Nevertheless, Beijing has remained Tanzania's top weapons suppliers-92 per cent of its imports in value between 2000 and 2015 and over 99 per 
Economic Relations: China as a Big Player Among Several
As elsewhere in Africa, China has become the largest supplier of Tanzania and Tanzanian exports have recently been impacted by China's economic slowdown. Chinese investments have increased and Chinese firms are heavily involved in the construction sector and Chinese banks are significant creditors. However, other partners continue to play an important and, arguably, increasing role in Tanzania's external economic relations.
Bi-lateral Trade: A North-South Pattern
China is Tanzania's first trade partner but it is rather a supplier than a client. In 2015 Tanzania imported 34.7 per cent of its goods from China. While China-Tanzania trade participates to the development of South-South relations, its composition has a typical North-South pattern as China exports manufactured goods and imports natural resources (Chaponnière, 2009 ). According to the The structure of Tanzanian imports from China is less concentrated than its exports to China. However, they are dominant in the Tanzanian market. A comparison of the 10 largest items shows that equipment and durable goods have gained ground at the expense of consumer goods and semi processed products. Chinese market share is over 50 per cent for several items: over two third of imported motorcycles and 80 per cent of imported pipes are Chinese.
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As elsewhere in Africa, textile firms, including China's built and painfully restructured in the 1990s (Lee. 2009: 650-660) , Friendship Textile Corp. in Urafiki, suffered from Chinese imports competition which increased four-fold to represent 45 per cent of Tanzanian textile and leather imports (Rutaihwa and Mkwawa, 2011) : Chinese competition has probably contributed to the slowing down of textile production which indices fell from 271 in 2006 to 186 in 2011 (index 100 in 1985) . According to the revised National accounts statistics published in November 2014, the share of manufacturing value added in GDP (seven per cent) has hardly changed since 2002. However, low productivity, high overall production costs and a lack of qualified labour force have continued to limit Chinese investments in Tanzania' manufacturing industry (Jansson, 2009; Kweka and Lu, 2013; World Bank, 2014; Wangwe et al., 2014) . And when Chinese enterprises invest in Tanzania, it is more for entering the local market and competing with Indian goods rather than for exporting (Interviews 1, 2 and 9).
Investments: from a low to high profile
Building infrastructure
As a result, China's main involvement in Tanzania has remained concentrated in the infrastructure sector. According to Mofcom data, the amount of international contracts won by Chinese companies in Tanzania 4 billion (2010-2015) while during the same period total disbursement by official lenders stood at US$ 8.3 billion. In addition to China Exim Bank, Beijing's major official lender, and private lenders, China's ZTE has made a US$ 300 million loan for financing telecom projects in Tanzania.
Outstanding Tanzanian external debt increased from US$ 7.8 billion (2010) increasing Tanzania's external debt but in less proportion than in the case for other East African countries, notably Ethiopia. Overall, China has gained influence in Tanzania through trade in goods and services (construction), and Chinese investment will probably increase. However, it is only one big player among several. And in order to "maximise its returns", Dar es Salaam is keen to diversify its external economic relations to the benefit of India, the EU or its own neighbours (Mponzi, 2014; Interview 7, 8 and 9) .
Conclusion
There is no doubt that the Tanzania-China partnership has remained politically strong. The frequency of visits since 2005, the special connection between the CCM and the CCP, the density of the bi-lateral military co-operation and the increase of goods and people flows between both countries illustrate the closeness and longevity of this relationship. Nevertheless, the old socialist "friendship" and solidarity between Dar es Salaam and Beijing have not really helped to adapt this partnership to the new neo-liberal international environment. In addition, China's rise has fed Tanzanian elites' growing criticism of the "one-way" nature of the China-Tanzania relationship (Biketeye, 2013) or what we would call its "structural asymmetry" and more importantly its North-South feature (Sigalla, 2014) . It has also convinced Dar es Salaam to rebalance its foreign relations in favour of other partners, particularly the US and the EU but also India and to move from bandwagonging China to a more cautious, "pragmatic" and "returns-maximising" hedging policy. In that respect, in our view, the Tanzania-China relationship is not as special as both governments claim and can be compared to other changing Africa-China relations (Cabestan, 2015) .
This evolution has also included a significant political and security dimension as the US and the EU have been eager, particularly since the late 1990s, to develop a stronger partnership in these areas with Tanzania. Dar es Salaam's gradual diplomatic adjustment in favour of the West, therefore, can be understood as a dependent variable of the growing Sino-US economic and geo-strategic competition in Africa.
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It is clear that Tanzania will continue to cultivate China both politically and economically as well as in terms of military co-operation, welcoming its highly competitive large-scale projects and, when need be, play it against its other partners (and vice-versa). However, mildly hedging against China, Tanzania's new foreign policy orientation has led to a relative decline of China's political and economic influence in Tanzania and to the emergence of stronger political and security links with the West and particularly the US.
In other words, this brief analysis of Tanzania-China relations contributes to nuancing the assessments about the growing Chinese imprint in Africa (Rotberg, 2008; Taylor, 2009) as well as Beijing's capacity to translate its growing economic and human interactions with Africa into political influence (Sun, 2014: 26-30) ; underscores the diversity of actors present on this continent (Li & Farah, 2013; Taylor, 2014) and, more importantly perhaps, highlights African countries more active and reactive behaviour vis-à-vis the planet's only "emerging potential superpower" (Hanauer & Morris, 2014) . However, in the asymmetrical multi-polar world in which we are today, this conclusion should not be surprising including for China which has been a strong promoter of this new world order. 
